GARY NORTH’S
REMNANT REVIEW
Matt. 6:33-34
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Vol. VI, No. 16 |
August 17, 1979 |
(You are about to read the most startling issue of Remnant Review ever published. In five years, I think it will be regarded as the most important issue ever published. I did not write it. The man who wrote it agreed to take the assignment only on the condition that he remain anonymous. This is necessary in order to protect his career, since he is presently employed in a most sensitive position in Washington, and he does not need the added publicity. I am putting my reputation on the line by publishing this report, and I assure you that I would not risk my reputation if 1 were not convinced that the man is reliable. I have known him for many years. He is a scholar. He holds the PhD in political science, and he has published in prestigious journals. He is regarded as one of the most informed conservatives in the field of European politics. He now devotes his skills full time to studying Soviet military strategy. He is no crackpot. If his analysis proves correct, then most of the so-called experts in Soviet studies will be regarded as the true crackpots. The shocking fact is that all of the information presented in this report is based on publicly available documents. My first reaction, three months ago, was simple: “Why haven’t I seen any of this in print in any of the conservative journals, let alone the regular news media?” I can almost guarantee you that this will be your response, too. But having seen the light — or more properly, the flash — I have decided to take action. I will be moving out of Durham before the end of the year. Durham is too vulnerable, not to Soviet missiles, but to the emergency regulations that the Federal government plans to impose immediately after a nuclear attack. I outline these in chapters 5 and 6 of my book, How You Can Profit from the Coming Price Controls. Another step I am taking is to publish this without the protection of copyright. Please feel free to reproduce it in any form. I will follow up on this report in the next issue of Remnant Review. I will offer-a comprehensive strategy of personal defense against the events that this report warns about. I assure you that the next issue will be fully copyrighted! — Gary North)
If the Soviet Union were to inflict a nuclear first strike upon the United States, well over 90% of the American people would read about the attack in their newspapers, or hear about it on radio or TV. Only a small percentage of Americans would see, hear, or feel any effects of the attack, and considerably less than one percent of us would become casualties. This is not wishful thinking, but rather a sober, detailed appraisal of the effects of the Soviet nuclear weapons which exist or are being built, if they were used according to the military strategy which the Soviet Union has been teaching to its forces since the beginning of the nuclear era. Soviet weapons are made especially to destroy American weapons — to defeat America while killing very few Americans and leaving our economy intact. Simply put, the Soviet Union is not out to destroy us, but to defeat us. We can take no comfort in this, because the Soviets have made tremendous strides toward being able to achieve this goal, and because, after being defeated by the Soviets, most Americans might wish that Armageddon had come instead.
All of this, of course, is contrary to the picture of nuclear war which has been propagated by most American politicians, academics, and publicists for a generation. According to their view, nuclear war would be a spasmodic exchange. Both the U.S. and the USSR would shoot everything they had at each others’ centers of population, literally bombing each other back into the Stone Age, or worse. Neither country could or would take any care, before or during the conflict, about limiting damage to itself. Each would strive only to annihilate the other even as it was being annihilated itself. As song writer Tom Lehrer once put it, “We will all go together when we go.” This very popular and reassuring view is shared by people as different in their political preferences as George McGovern and Barry Goldwater.
The popular American picture of nuclear war has always been utter nonsense. Nonetheless, the technological advances of recent years have made it even more criminally stupid. First, the military capacity of the two sides has never been equal. During the 1950’s, had we gone to war with the Soviets, nearly all our bombers would have gotten through to Soviet targets, while very few Soviet ones would have made it to our borders. During the early 1960’s, our missiles, inaccurate as they were, could have knocked out the Soviets’ few missiles, which were then located on soft pads well known to our satellites. During the remainder of the 1960’s, when both we and the Soviets placed our missiles in hardened silos or submarines, there was some reason to believe that we and the Soviets were equally targeting each others’ population. But it was not so. We targeted industries, while the Soviets targeted our air and naval bases. But we had a bigger force. Had we gone to war in the late 1960’s, we would have lost most of our military power, while the Soviet Union would have lost a fourth of its population and less than half of its industry. Since the early 1970’s, it has been beyond dispute that the Soviet Union has a superior ICBM force built for one primary mission: destroying American missiles in their silos. (Roger D. Speed, Strategic Deterrence in the 1980’s [Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1979].) By so doing the Soviet Union can diminish the United States’ ability to strike back with its population-killing weapons. So, to sum up, at different times either side has had finite military ability to defeat the other and protect itself. Second, and most important, the American image of nuclear war as Armageddon is false because while American planners, beginning with Robert McNamara, have disapproved of destroying enemy weapons, and have not attempted to design plans which might allow the U.S. to survive a nuclear war, the men in charge of the Soviet military establishment have never wavered from the view that wars have winners and losers and that the job of the Soviet military is to protect the Soviet Union by smashing the enemy’s weapons.
Thus while American policies have aimed at producing dead Russians while leaving intact Soviet strategic weapons, the Soviet Union has never targeted our population. (Fritz Earmarth, “Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought,” International Security [Spring, 1978].) As a result of our misperception, we have been worrying needlessly about being burned to a crisp, or about dying of radiation sickness (a la the movie “On the Beach”). We have worried ourselves so irrationally about a far-fetched danger that we have rendered ourselves incapable of doing anything about the present danger—the Soviet Union’s growing ability to defeat us and to do to us what it has done to other peoples it has conquered.
At the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Soviets, had less than ten SS-6 intercontinental missiles capable of striking the U.S. These lumbering giants were aimed at U.S. Air Force bases. They were dangerous above all to the people who had to pump fuel into them. Today, Soviet missiles capable of reaching the U.S. number at least 2400 modern types. (All figures for strategic deployments are taken from the book edited by Paul Nitze, The Fateful Ends and Shades of SALT [New York: Crane Russak & Co., 1979J.) We must say “at least” because we really have no idea just how many missiles the Soviet Union has built and stored, ready for use. The Soviets have always refused to let us examine their facilities for producing missiles, while the United States’ vaunted intelligence satellites simply cannot look through roofs, or darkness, or clouds. Nor can they overhear anything that is not broadcast in the clear. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the SALT negotiations ten years ago, the U.S. agreed to believe officially that the Soviets had only as many missiles as they had silos in the ground and in launcher tubes on submarines. Thus the SALT treaties have not limited the production of missiles, but only the deployment of things which American intelligence systems can count—silos and submarines. At any rate, regardless of the missiles they might have hidden, 2400 is the number of missiles and bombers the Soviets have openly deployed.
At least 326 of these missiles are SS-18’s. These carry ten independently targeted warheads, each of which has a yield of about one megaton—one million tons of TNT. (This is a highly tentative estimate, because the U.S. really does not understand how Soviets build nuclear weapons.) These 3000+ Soviet warheads carry more explosive power than the entire American missile force put together. These warheads by themselves are also sufficient to cover every American “hard target” twice over. They would have to, because prudent planners assign two warheads to critically important targets—such as missile silos and “command and control” points—which have been armored to resist nuclear explosions. The United States has less than 1500 such sites overall, each able to resist pressures of 1000 lbs. per square inch. (Figures for hardness of American and Soviet Silos are reported in Counterforce Issues, published by the Congressional Budget Office, 1978.) The SS-18’s warheads are accurate enough to place their megaton within about one-tenth of a mile of the target—close enough to be quite sure of killing it. (Performance data for Soviet and American missiles are from Jane’s Weapon Systems, 1978-79.) The SS-18’s alone can go a long way toward disarming the United States.
The Soviet Union either has deployed or is now deploying 500 SS-17’s and SS-19’s. These missiles carry four and six warheads respectively. Though not quite so accurate as the 18’s, these twenty-five hundred megaton size warheads could kill “hard targets.” But they could also be used to destroy “soft” military targets such as air bases, or be kept in reserve to threaten cities. In addition, there are almost 600 SS-ll’s, each carrying one megaton. The Soviet Union has also deployed some 900 missiles aboard submarines. Almost half of these are longer range than anything aboard American ones, and about two hundred of these carry multiple warheads. By the early 1980’s, the Tatter’s number will rise to about 500. The Soviet submarine force should be expected to have over two thousand warheads, each of which would yield between 500 kilotons and one megaton. Such warheads, however, ire only accurate to within a half mile. Therefore they can be used to attack air bases or to threaten cities.
The Soviet heavy bomber force is small — less than 150 operational Bears and Bisons. Yet it can easily be augmented by 200 Backfire medium to long-range bombers, or even by cargo aircraft. The reason is simple: Soviet aircraft seeking to drop bombs on the U.S. need not use speed, low altitude, or deception to counteract American air defenses, because none exist. They have been dismantled over the past two decades. Even civilian cargo planes could be used to bomb the U.S.!
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has deployed 6500 air-defense radars, 10,000 interceptor missiles, and 2600 interceptor aircraft. It practices air-defense constantly. It has also built four huge phased-array radars which can be the core of a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles. The other components of such a defense already exist. The Soviet Union has but to mass produce them—which, for all we know, it may be doing—in order to have a respectable defense. To back up its active defenses, the Soviet Union has an expanding civil defense, featuring hard shelters for about one-fourth of the urban population, protection for vital industries, and sheltered food supplies.
The backbone of the American force is the Polaris-Poseidon fleet. These 41 submarines carry 16 missiles each—a total of 656 missiles, which can carry some 5000 - 5400 nuclear warheads. About half of this force—some 2500 warheads — is at sea at any given time. Most of it could survive any Soviet attack. But the Polaris-Poseidon warheads are curious weapons. They yield only 40 kilotons each, and are accurate to about four-tenths of a mile. Thus they are optimal for attacking soft targets, such as residential areas. They are less useful for military targets, and totally useless against “hard” targets. This is by design. As Poseidon was being perfected, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara rejected plans to fit it with three big, accurate warheads, on the grounds that the ability to strike “hard targets” was against America’s strategic policy.
That policy, simply put, is to deter war by threatening to kill Soviet civilians in a second strike. According to that policy, any weapon which can destroy missile silos makes war more likely because it gives its owners several militarily rational options—including a first strike. The objective of nuclear strategy, according to people such as Robert McNamara and the Carter Administration, is to make war wholly irrational for all concerned. The Poseidon, with its many, small, inaccurate warheads, is certainly an irrational weapon.
The 1000 Minuteman II’s and III’s are spread in silos at the following Air Force bases: Grand Forks, North Dakota; Malmstrom, Montana; Whiteman, Missouri; Warren, Wyoming; Minot, North Dakota; and Ellsworth, South Dakota. Fifty-four Titan II’s are located at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, and Little Rock AFB, Arkansas. Even the best of these, the 550 Minuteman Ill’s, have but slight chances against Soviet silos and military communications centers “hardened” to some 2500 pounds per square inch. These missiles, then, can best be used against industrial targets and relatively soft military ones. But, since the Soviets have weapons capable of destroying them on the ground, these missiles may do nothing more in wartime than “soak up” Soviet warheads.
The American bomber force is old. Its mainstay, the B-52, was designed during the Truman Administration. President Carter cancelled production of its successor, the B-l. The B-52’s in service now are older than the pilots who fly them. Some 300 B-52’s are flyable. Each carries about four bombs. In the future, they may carry cruise missiles. One-third of the B-52’s are on ground alert at some 25 bases. If the Soviet Union attacked these bases with submarine-launched missiles, and also barraged the bombers’ escape corridors, not many would survive to try their luck against Soviet air defenses.
American defenses are practically non-existent. The old Distant Early Warning (DEW) line of arctic radars is obsolete. Anyone with a terrain map of Northern Canada can figure out the holes in it. Once a Soviet pilot gets through that, he can be confident of flying to his destination undetected. Even if he were detected, little could be done. The U.S. has only 300 old F-106 interceptors, and no surface-to-air missiles deployed to defend the country. The U.S. has developed excellent technology by which to defend against ballistic missiles, but has renounced its use. According to American strategic doctrine, safety lies in mutual vulnerability. So far do American officials adhere to this doctrine, that the U.S. is wholly without civil defense. There are practically no blast shelters in the U.S., and certainly no strategic storage of food.
It is clear that the biggest difference between the Soviet and the American force—bigger than the differences in hardware—concerns the purposes for which the weapons may be used. Soviet military writings refer to deterrence quite differently from American ones. Whereas American Defense intellectuals see the weapons as scarecrows by which to ward off attack on American cities, the Soviets see them as tools by which to achieve their ends. Thus, for them, deterrence is an offensive concept: that is, to keep the Americans from thwarting Soviet purposes. For them, deterrence is achieved by the ability to win the war. (J. Douglas and A. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War [Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1979].)
The Soviets expect that the U.S. would be deterred from doing anything serious to stop the ultimate triumph of the Marxist “Socialist Commonwealth” by the following prospect. If pressed too far, the Soviet Union could launch its force of SS-18’s and therewith destroy nearly all American land-based missiles and bombers. At the same time, Soviet ships or aircraft would mine the harbors where half of the American Polaris-Poseidon submarines lay. This would put the submarines out of action, and keep them where they could be destroyed at will by ICBMs, quite without killing Americans. Reduced to some 2500 40 Kiloton warheads, what could the U.S. do? The USSR would still have about 7000 warheads — all invulnerable. If the U.S. chose to strike back, it could not thereby reduce the threat to itself. At this point, the U.S. would have suffered militarily, but in no other way. The 3000 Soviet megatons which would already have exploded over places such as Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona and Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, would have killed less than a quarter-million Americans — five years’ traffic fatalities. Nearly all of the casualties would have been military personnel or their dependents. But if, at this point, an American President ordered a strike at Soviet cities, he would risk a Soviet attack on America’s population. At this point, negotiated surrender would make far more sense. Moreover, even if the President of the U.S., or several submarine crews acting on their own, were to launch Polaris-Poseidon on the Soviet Union, they could do relatively little damage. The Soviet civil defense system would have been on alert. The key industries would have shut down, “hardened” their machinery, and sheltered their workers. The rest of the urban population, the non-essentials, would have been placed in lesser shelters or sent to outlying areas. Finally, the incoming American warheads would probably be met by some kind of antiballistic missile system. (It is doubtful the Soviets would initiate such an attack until their plans for missile defense were well along.) That fraction of the American warheads which arrived—probably far less than 100—would knock down a lot of buildings. (T. K. Jones and Scott Thompson, “Central War and Civil Defense,” Orbis [Fall, 1978].) The future would belong to the Soviet Union.
This scenario could occur any time after 1981, when the Soviets will have completed deployment of their fourth-generation ICBM strike force. But because persons knowledgeable in military affairs know it could, the Soviet Union may not need to carry out an actual strike. In recent years American leaders have said loudly and often that military power no longer matters in world affairs. (Gen. Dan Graham, Shall America Be Defended? [New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1979].) They have been whistling in the dark. More people’s fates have been affected by military victories and defeats since 1960 than during World War II. During these years India has beaten Pakistan twice, Israel has beaten Arab coalitions twice, North Viet Nam, with Soviet help, has beaten the U.S., Soviet clients have triumphed in Cuba, Nicaragua, Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Laos, and Cambodia. They narrowly failed in Zaire and Indonesia. Soviet clients or sympathizers have also waged inconclusive wars or have attempted coups d’etat in nearly every country of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The Soviet Union has repeatedly vowed support for such enterprises, and has made clear that their success depends on the growth of Soviet power. Certainly the fear of greater Soviet involvement kept the United States from winning in Viet Nam. That fear has helped to convince American policymakers not to help America’s beleaguered friends in places like Iran. In 1973, the threat of Soviet intervention into the Middle East led the U.S. to stop Israel from consummating its victory against Soviet-supplied Arab armies which had attacked her on her highest holiday. The same prospect frightened the U.S. into submitting to virtual expropriation of its oil production equipment in the Middle East, and the quadrupling of the price of oil.
As the Soviet Union’s arsenal becomes more fearsome, it will become more reasonable for the Soviet Union’s friends around the world to be bolder, and it will be more reasonable for the United States and its friends to do more and to suffer more to avoid antagonizing the Soviets.
The incentives for friendship with the U.S. can only drop. Consider Europe, which is tied to us by bonds of kinship, culture, and interest. What would happen if, in 1982, the Soviet Union (or East Germany) quickly seized just a couple of square miles of farmland on the German border on some transparent pretext? One thing is certain not to happen. The U.S. would surely not launch nuclear strikes against Soviet cities. That would serve no rational purpose whatever. Would NATO then attack to take back those few square miles? Given that the Soviet Union can muster on the central front 21,000 tanks to NATO’s 7000, over 4000 aircraft to NATO’s approximately 2000, as well as almost two soldiers for each of NATO’s, a NATO attack would make no sense. Of course the Soviets would call for negotiations. No doubt NATO would attend.
What would Europe have to gain by taking an intransigent attitude toward the Soviet Union? Such an attitude would get Europe nothing but military trouble, which the U.S. could not alleviate. The U.S. could not help to defend Europe because the U.S. could not protect itself. American ground and air forces in Europe could not stop a Soviet advance. But if American strategic weapons were used against Soviet forces in Europe, the Soviet Union could well afford to unleash a disarming strike upon the United States. Knowledge of this—not the small amount of force used to take the small border area—would quickly detach Europe from the United States. This end could be accomplished quickly with even less direct expenditure of force. The Soviets could stage a coup d’etat or other military action against Saudi Arabia. The PLO would gladly lend itself to such a venture. Would America risk World War III (which American planners have made sure the U.S. will lose) for the sake of the Saudi Royal Family? But with Saudi Arabia—the world’s largest exporter of oil—in anti-imperialists’ hands, the Soviet Union would be in a position to approach Europe with the offer to facilitate their oil supplies at stable prices — if only Europe would slip out of its relationship with the United States. Given the balance of forces between the U.S. and USSR in the early to mid 1980’s, the Europeans would have to be heroes to refuse the Soviets’ offer.
The decisive defeat of the United States in the world—a defeat which would leave no doubt in anyone’s mind who ruled the world—could be accomplished even more easily, given the “cover” of decisive nuclear superiority. On Oct. 1, 1979, the pro-Soviet government of Panama becomes legally sovereign over the whole Panama Canal Zone. Anytime thereafter it can abrogate the treaties which preserve a residual role for the U.S. Then it can ask the Soviet Union to send troops to help protect the Canal from the U.S. Of course the U.S. would enjoy local military superiority. But, given the Soviets’ ability to carry out a disarming nuclear strike on the U.S., and the latter’s inability to disarm the Soviet Union, would the U.S. actually risk killing Russian soldiers? It would be more reasonable to absorb the loss of the Canal, and of the last shreds of American influence in the world.
Such losses could not help but jar the United States into realizing that strategic inferiority to the Soviet Union can only lead to enslavement. But surely, by the mid-1980’s, this realization would come too late. Surely the U.S. would begin to build the weapons it should have built during the 1960’s and 1980’s. But how would the U.S. respond to a Soviet declaration that the continuation of such an American build-up would be regarded as an act of war, for which the U.S. would bear full responsibility? If the U.S. chose to disregard the warning, the Soviets could look forward to losing their supremacy in a few years. Why should they not use it while they had it?
Subjugation of the United States would open new and more violent chapters in the history of the world. We can but speculate beyond the first one, the outlines of which are clear. The Soviet Union and its victorious coalition will still be hungry. Moreover, they are possessed of an ideology which tells them that the wealth of the formerly free world consists of goods somehow stolen from them. The rape of the United States would be swift. Russians have never been very farsighted in the husbanding of golden geese. The history of postwar Eastern Europe indicates the Soviets would set unrealistic reparations quotas and try to squeeze blood from stones. They would attempt to rid the economy of “parasitic” occupations—and to rid the earth of “useless mouths.” All would be made even harsher by the inevitable campaigns against religion, the family, and other ancestral enemies of Communism. Those given power would be the most reliable. Reliability would be proved by harshness. Unfortunately, this is not speculation, but dreary experience. The history of Soviet rule consists of little else.
The United States is not doomed to defeat. The Soviets have not built their nuclear forces by peculiar genius. The U.S. possesses technology to build weapons of the same kind that are even better. More important, the U.S. possesses the technology to build weapons of altogether different kinds, weapons which are likely to safeguard both our freedoms and our lives. Of course to build these things at all we would have to change the way our officials have been thinking about war and weapons. Much would happen, however, if the American people transmitted one simple message to their officials: “We want to survive any war with our freedoms intact.”
With such a mandate, the next President of the United States would begin by ordering the U.S. Air Force to remove the Minuteman II’s and Ill’s from their silos, to place them inside their factory canisters, and to keep them on the move aboard trucks, whence they could be launched. (See Aviation Week and Space Technology [19 June, 1979].) This would remove the Soviet Union’s ability to target and destroy these missiles. With that gone, the Soviet Union would lose a large part of the military incentive for a first strike.
Second, the President would order the abolition of the system by which the U.S. has acquired weapons since 1963. Before 1963 it took about six years to translate an idea into a weapons system. Now it takes about fifteen years. This system has reduced the U.S. armed forces to one of the worst-equipped forces in the world. If we proceed as we have been, the MX missile, our first counterforce weapon, won’t be fully deployed until 1990. That will be years after the Soviets will have achieved a counterforce capability against the U.S. 1990 is too late. With the WWII purchase system in effect, the U.S. could quickly build a mobile heavy missile, capable of taking out enemy silos. If we went about it on a crash basis, we could have the missile moving on American roads by 1983. Even more quickly, the U.S. could change the warheads on the Poseidon—reducing their number, and making them accurate weapon killers instead of terror bombs. A mere 1200 big, accurate warheads aboard our submarines would do more to defend us than the 5000+ little, inaccurate ones we now have. Once these weapons were in hand, our targeting strategy could stop aiming at producing dead Russians, and could begin to concern itself with protecting Americans. With the weapons we have in 1979, even a massive change in American targeting doctrine could not hope to reduce the threat to the U.S. We simply need new weapons.
More important still, the U.S. could take advantage of new advances in the technology of anti-missile missiles and radars. These are especially efficient for defending mobile missiles deceptively based. The anti-missile missile need only shoot down the warheads which are actually heading for the right targets. A National network of interceptor missiles for the defense of our population is expensive, but possible. Just as possible but less expensive is a defense against ballistic missiles based on laser stations in space. (See Sen. Malcolm Wallop, “The Emerging Possibilities for Defense,” Strategic Review [Fall, 1979].) This is not a Buck Rogers system. The technology for it is well known in the U.S. Lasers are not objects of speculation, as are particle beams. Megawatt-size lasers are weapons of today. With every passing year, technology is making it even more possible for defensive forces to seize the advantage over offensive ones.
By 1982 at the latest, the U.S. will enter the most dangerous period in its history. In order to avoid the risk of disastrous defeat, the U.S. must begin to take action now, and surely cannot afford to put off certain crash programs beyond the first days of a new Administration. These crash programs should: take our Minutemen out of their holes and fit them with counterforce warheads, fit Polaris-Poseidon with counterforce warheads, build a truly mobile MX, unhampered by Rube-Goldberg basing schemes, the B-l bomber, anti-missile missiles, and space-based lasers. The country may not be able to complete these programs in time. But it can try.
It is impossible to understand the Biblical doctrine of law and justice without recognizing that it requires a principle of separation. God identifies Himself as a Jealous God, and, in prohibiting foreign alliances with nations of another faith, and mixed marriages with unbelievers, Moses declares that “the Lord, whose name is Jealous, is a Jealous God” (Ex. 34:14).
Every religion has its own concept of morality and law. A treaty or covenant implies and requires a common faith, law, and morality. Hence, alliances with powers whose faith is alien to God are strictly forbidden (Ex. 23:32-33; Ex. 34:12-16).
First, such a treaty presupposes a common faith, law, and morality, when such is not the case. Second, the accomodating power thus compromises and surrenders its own position, its law and morality, and apostasizes from its God.
The U.S.S.R. is an atheistic power, whose doctrine of law is that law is an instrument of class warfare and must represent class interests. Thus, a treaty for the U.S.S.R. must be an instrument of class warfare and a means of destroying all enemies of the Marxist proletariat and its dictatorship.
In the U.S.A., a less clear legal tradition exists. A strong background and continuing presence of Biblical law dominates the scene; common law is also widely used, and is a mixture of Biblical law and custom, civil law is widely in use, and, while extensively humanistic, sees law as concerned with equal Justice for all classes, and all peoples, in the tradition of Biblical law.
Marxist class law is at war with all three American legal doctrines. U.S. liberals follow the civil law tradition in the main, and they see treaties in terms of it, failing to realize that law, in every religion and culture, is a radically different thing in its presuppositions and facts. For the U.S.S.R., no treaty or law can be tolerated unless it serves to further the world-wide class war. Salt II is such a treaty.