Missouri's 7th District, U.S. House of Representatives




Congressional Issues 2010

Magic, Envy, and Economic Underdevelopment
by Gary North

Since the great depression of the 1930’s, and especially since 1945, the concern of concerns among orthodox Keynesian economic planners has been economic growth. The wartime planning experiences of many economists and industrial managers convinced them of the efficacy of central planning, or at least modified planning in a so-called “mixed” economy. A very forthright admission in this regard was made in the mid-1960’s by Barbara Ward, England’s establishment economist. Principle is out; pragmatism is in: “Thus, not by theory or dogma but largely by war-induced experience the Western market economies have come to accept the effectiveness and usefulness of a partnership between public and private activity . . . but there is now no question of exclusive reliance on any one instrument or any one method. The pragmatic market economies have worked out their own evolving conceptions of public and private responsibility and the result is the dynamic but surprisingly stable mixed economy of the Western world.”[1] Almost as she was writing these words—in fact, precisely when she was writing them—the highly regarded stability of the Western economies was beginning to shatter on the rock of monetary inflation and its induced boom-bust cycle. Virtually at the end of the road for successful Keynesian planning—”successful” being defined as temporarily stable and publicly (politically) acceptable—a series of such overconfident books and articles were published. Today, they are jokes. Even the most Liberal of our political cartoonists have punctured the economists’ (meaning Keynesians’) balloon. [2]

Not all economists became enamored by their experiences in wartime planning. Probably the most prominent English economist who did was Lionel (Lord) Robbins, who subsequently disinherited his own very fine book, The Great Depression (Macmillan, 1934). Yet it was not so much the professional economists whose experience in World War I and later in World War II led them down the primrose path of central economic planning. As Hayek has noted, the ones who were really captivated by the wonders of central planning were the businessmen! This was especially true of the ones involved in the First World War. “I think the most remarkable thing was that the most ambitious planners among them were not the academic people who had gone into planning but were the business leaders who had been called into a planning activity and found that in directing a whole industry they were saved so many of the troubles they had as individual enterprises that they were greatly attracted by the idea of preserving centralized direction of monopolized industries.” It was much the same in the Second World War, Hayek argues, at least among the businessmen. “The noneconomists among them, I think, have shown very much the same reactions as the planners of World War I. They were fascinated by the delectable task of running a big thing, and, if they had views favorable to it beforehand, they had only become more convinced planners by their experience.”[3] If anything, Hayek said, the English economists he had known were more skeptical afterward.

The younger Keynesians, however, had been given their baptism in the “real” world, and they cried for more. They did not want to see the reappearance of depression after the war (which most economists had expected in 1945), and they fervently believed that the “successful” Keynesian tool kit could solve the problems. It was the philosophy of stones into bread.[4] Growth could be planned, directed, and brought into existence by the use of macroeconomic models. When continuing monetary inflation kept the post-war depression repressed, [5] Keynesians took heart. The millennium had come. The tool kit worked. The Cold War, plus Korea, plus more Cold War equalled [sic] a politically acceptable excuse for keeping central planning and high federal budget expenditures. The budget was the central lever; it would be the device used to keep prosperity running smoothly. Only to keep the budget from absorbing too much of the consumers’ money, they had to create new money through the Federal Reserve System, to help purchase a portion of the federal debt. From $20 billion held by the Fed as a monetary reserve in 1950 to $27 billion in 1960, to $62 billion in 1970 and to $84 billion in July of 1974, the trend is clear: more federal debt certificates held by the Federal Reserve System, and more money created as a result of this debt (which is legally “as good as gold” for use as a national monetary reserve.)[6] The consumers received more money to spend, but after 1964, this new money began to make itself felt in the consumer goods markets. Price inflation had arrived.

The confidence of the Keynesian planners had been so great that they had believed that it was the Keynesian tool kit of deficit financing and central planning that had brought the miracle. They began to believe that this tool kit could be exported. It would make it possible for Cambridge- and Harvard-educated leaders from backward (later politely changed to “underdeveloped”) nations to bring Western prosperity to their lands. A new economic sub-field was born after 1945: economic development. Its rationale was clear: the justification of massive (never sufficient) giveaways by Western central governments of wealth coercively extracted from their own citizens’ pockets. At some undefined point, these so-called “transfer payments” would enable the recipient nations to become productive. Economic growth would then be the West’s primary export. “Primitive” cultures could then become “modern.” Stones into bread would be a worldwide phenomenon.

The conception of a “primitive” culture needs explanation. Whether we choose to call a culture primitive, backward, or merely underdeveloped, we still have the same basic concept in mind. It is almost universally assumed that “primitive” means temporally prior in some kind of development outline. Almost invariably, the guiding intellectual framework is that of cultural evolution. Today, the concept may be referred to as developmentalism. Its history is ancient; it was present long before Darwin brought his researches to light. If anything, it was the concept of cultural evolution which acted as an intellectual paradigm for the cosmological evolutionists (e.g., Kant) and later the biological evolutionists (e.g., Buffon, Lamarck, Erasmus Darwin, Spencer, Charles Darwin).[7]

Developmentalism is strictly a Western product, or at least linear developmentalism is. Classical antiquity held to a cyclical concept of social change; although unique historical events might have been emphasized by classical historians, the cyclical pattern of degeneration and transformation maintained its grip on men’s minds. Man’s history was one of degeneration: golden age, silver age, bronze age, iron age. Hesiod’s Works and Days (8th century B.C.) was built around this conception. Only the promise of some divine world savior -- a secular, political figure -- offered hope, and this was only the hope that some discontinuous event or person would hurl men upward, only to begin a new process of degeneration. [8] The process was understood to be eternal.

Augustine modified this conception, following the principles of interpretation set forth by the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures. Human existence is bound. Men are born, live, and die. There has been an original creation out of nothing. There will be a final judgment. While all human institutions are transitory, coming and going endlessly, there is meaning and structure to history, for it is guided by a sovereign Creator. The city of man is subject to flux, but the City of God -- the eternal, spiritual city -- is unchanging. It provides our standards of achievement and our eternal reward or damnation. This world of the heavenly city is permanent, unlike the world built by men’s hands. There is spiritual progress in life, for the kingdom of God has come; Jesus Christ appeared among men, and His church shall never be destroyed. Augustine did not believe in earthly developmentalism, however. His developmentalism was confined to spiritual growth.[9] He had abandoned the earthly optimism of the fourth-century historian, Eusebius, who had seen in Constantine’s reign the beginning of an earthly kingdom of political, as well as spiritual, authority. [10]

The seventeenth century brought a further modification of Augustine’s vision of linear spiritual development. A revival of Eusebius’ earthly optimism within Puritan circles was one half of the modification. The vision of the Holy Commonwealth captured the minds of two generations, from about 1600 to 1660. [11] Simultaneously, Enlightenment secularism revived the old optimism. But Enlightenment speculation was something entirely different from Puritan hopes. Rationalism returned to the cosmology of Aristotle and the ancients (e.g., Physics, VIII), borrowing from them the concept of uncreated and unending matter. They fused this concept with Augustine’s linear spiritual developmentalism. Thus was born the secular idea of progress. As Robert Nisbet has so ably summarized it: “By the late 17th century, Western philosophers, noting that the earth’s frame had still not been consumed by Augustinian holocaust, took a kind of politician’s courage in the fact, and declared bravely that the world was never going to end (Descartes, it seemed, had proved this) and that mankind was going to become ever more knowledgeable and, who knows, progressively happy.” [12] In short, only after the year 1600 did men affirm the possibility of earthly development in a linear fashion. It was this optimism which made possible the very concept of economic growth as a long-term phenomenon. It was historical linearity as a fact and a concept which made possible the modern world. The roots of this linearity are distinctly Christian and exclusively Western.

The secular version of progress suffered from the very first from a fundamental confusion. It is one thing to affirm historical linearity as a means of intellectual classification. It is something very different to assume (and assert) that this historical linearity is somehow self-generated, irreversible, and universal. It was also assumed that this kind of developmental change is uniformitarian; in the absence of “regressive” historical or institutional barriers, all social change is progressively constant, devoid of discontinuous leaps. To apply this distinctly philosophical set of concepts to historical change, argues Nisbet, is woefully misleading. To say that one “culture”—itself an intellectual abstraction by selective observers —necessarily or automatically produces another culture (in the absence of “unnatural” or “retarding” barriers, of course), is utterly unproven and probably unprovable.[13] The Puritan conception, based on the outline of Deuteronomy 8, was that godly obedience by the majority of a community will produce, by God’s grace, economic and spiritual progress. It was never based on some hypothetical “natural” progression of cultural stages. In fact, the Puritan conception was almost the opposite: what is most natural—ethical rebellion and perversity—leads to cultural degeneration. But it was not the Puritan conception which triumphed in the eighteenth century and after; it was the Enlightenment’s fusion of Aristotelian cosmological autonomy and Augustinian progress.

The most famous applications of the “stage theory” were those of Hegel and Marx. They were sons of the Enlightenment. In our own day, the most famous book on economic developmentalism has been Walt Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960), a widely read book on the campuses in the early 1960’s, prior, of course, to Rostow’s affiliation with President Johnson’s Vietnam policies. (He became an academic pariah after 1965, as a direct result of his colleagues’ loss of faith in the old Progressivism’s international secular messianism. Rostow, sadly for him, had kept the faith, but the “old time religion” of New Deal internationalism was no longer selling in academia.) The negative reaction to Rostow’s political views after 1965 led to the burial of his book, but the book’s academic burial had come several years before, in a meeting of economic historians who had come to discuss the Rostow thesis. The proceedings of that conference were published in 1963, but almost nobody noticed them. All of Rostow’s concrete proposals for exported economic growth were shown to be statistically and even theoretically unfounded, and he publicly backed down from several of them. Most of the contributing scholars concluded that there are no statistical or theoretical handles available to indicate when or exactly how a society “takes off” into self-sustained (Rostow later modified this to “sustained”) economic growth. [14] The old faith in autonomous, irreversible, uniformitarian economic growth had been examined carefully, and however much the economists liked the idea, it was shown to be little more than a hope. When concretized in historical situations, his “stage theory” broke down almost completely. The universalism of developmentalism (as a process in actual history) faded. Only the hope remains.

But a major question still confronts the historians and economists: What factors contribute to economic growth? Why do some societies grow steadily, seemingly as a result of their own people’s efforts, while others stagnate, despite foreign aid? The best answers have been offered by three scholars: an economist (P. T. Bauer), a political scientist (Edward Banfield), and a sociologist (Helmut Schoeck). Bauer, a professor at the London School of Economics, has published several important books on the topic of economic development, but by far his most comprehensive work is Dissent on Development, published by Harvard University Press in 1972. The key to economic development in a society, argues Bauer, is the character of the people. The presence of a socialist planning apparatus inhibits development, since it pours money into state-approved projects, bases its decisions on politics rather than economic returns, and acts as a scapegoat for personal failure (“the government did this to me”). But far more important is the attitude of the population:

Examples of significant attitudes, beliefs and modes of conduct unfavorable to material progress include lack of interest in material advance, combined with resignation in the face of poverty; lack of initiative, self-reliance and a sense of personal responsibility for the economic fortune of oneself and one’s family; high leisure preference, together with a lassitude often found in tropical climates; relatively high prestige of passive or contemplative life compared to active life; the prestige of mysticism and of renunciation of the world compared to acquisition and achievement; acceptance of the idea of a preordained, unchanging and unchangeable universe; emphasis on performance of duties and acceptance of obligations, rather than on achievement or results, or assertion or even recognition of personal rights; lack of sustained curiosity, experimentation and interest in change; belief in the efficacy of supernatural and occult forces and of their influence over one’s destiny; insistence on the unity of the organic universe, and on the need to live with nature rather than conquer it or harness it to man’s needs, an attitude of which reluctance to take animal life is a corollary; belief in perpetual reincarnation, which reduces the significance of effort in the course of the present life; recognized status of beggary, together with a lack of stigma in the acceptance of charity; opposition to women’s work outside the household [pp. 78-79].

These attitudes are primarily religious in nature. They are not easily changed, and money alone, even billions of dollars annually, are not likely to alter them significantly. A nation dependent on another nation’s largesse is still caught in the trap of the occult. The increased wealth is not a product of the recipient nation’s planning, conscientious men. It therefore will not teach men that wealth stems from moral action and obedience to basic principles of conduct (Deut. 8). The presence of attitudes such as those described in Bauer’s summary are the sign of “primitivism.” Primitive external conditions that persist in a culture through countless generations are a sign of cultural degeneration—the wrath of God (Deut. 8; 28).

Bauer’s favorite example of a population that has pulled itself up by its own bootstraps, without foreign aid, natural resources, or a system of massive central planning, is that little piece of rock south of China, Hong Kong. Free trade, open entry to occupations, low taxes (until quite recently), the right of profit, and an attitude favorable to growth have combined to produce an economic miracle. Even the Japanese cannot compete with them; American capitalists long ago began screaming about the “unfair competition”—read: effective competition—of the inhabitants of this bit of rock. But Africa stagnates, with its untold mineral wealth, or even declines economically.

Edward Banfield’s gem of a book, The Unheavenly City (1970), earned him the wrath of most of the academic profession, as well as the students at Harvard University. So continuous and bitter was the student opposition that Banfield finally left “scholarly” Harvard for the University of Pennsylvania. What was the cause of such an outcry? Simple: Ban-field had concluded that the economic backwardness of the ghetto is primarily the product of the chosen style of life of the majority of those who live in the ghetto. Most crucial, argues Banfield, is their conception of the future: they are present-oriented. They want immediate gratification. They want excitement—”action”—to brighten their otherwise dull lives. They want no part of the white middle class and its world of plodding stability. Present-orientation is the key to understanding the concept of “lower class,” not present income. Present income can rise later; it can be supplemented by income from other family members. But present-orientedness is internal. There is no imposed solution possible: no school program, with its system of endless written exams; no job training programs, that in 1967 were costing $8,000 per enrollee; no system of rehabilitation for hardened criminals. The problem is spiritual, moral, and cultural. White money changes only the level of activity in the ghetto, not its general direction. [15]

Both Bauer and Banfield have struck at the very heart of modern economic Liberalism. The simple world of environmentalism is a myth, they have concluded. So many dollars per capita of wealth redistribution on the part of civil governments mean nothing. The key is internal. White middle class bureaucrats, armed with their dollars and their survey forms, do not and cannot change anything. The old routine of “find a problem, cure a problem” is too simplistic; money and more public education are insufficient. White middle class bureaucrats have tried to transform men’s lives and cultures by spending other people’s money. It has been dollar diplomacy of the grossest kind: the attempt to buy people’s minds. And it has failed, and failed miserably. The policies of Liberal reformism have constituted a massive, endless failure. The operating presupposition of their programs has been external environmentalism, and that principle is totally false. The problems are moral not external. The slums are in people’s hearts. Thus, concludes Nisbet in his lively review of Banfield’s book, the old formula of Liberal bureaucracy has to be changed, from “Don’t just sit there, do something!” to “Don’t just do something, sit there!” [16]

Corroborating evidence has been produced in the field of public education. James S. Coleman supervised a major study of educational opportunity in the United States back in the mid-1960’s. One estimate has placed it as the second most expensive social science research project in our history. Naturally, the federal government funded it. The result was a lengthy report: Equality of Educational Opportunity (Government Printing Office, 1966). The data were startling. School facilities for black and white children, in any given region of the country, are about equal within that region, and equal in almost every statistically measurable respect. Per capita student expenditures are about the same. So is teacher training. The results have been studied by a number of scholars, and their collective conclusions have been published.[17] The primary conclusion of the Coleman Report and those studying its figures is simple: there is no measurable impact that public schools have had on eliminating or even modifying comparative achievement among students. Furthermore, the data indicate that no known change in school inputs—teacher salaries, more expensive facilities, bigger school libraries—is likely to have any significant effect on student output. As the editors have written, “The central fact is that its findings were seen as threatening to the political coalition that sponsored it.” [18] Understandably, it was ignored as long as possible.

What factors are important, according to the Coleman Report? Primarily, family inputs. Innate ability, peer group pressures, and community standards are also important. In short, there is no sign that anything short of radical reconstruction of the whole society would change the learning patterns of students, and there is no guarantee that even this would do anything but lower all performance to the least common denominator. Once again, the simplistic environmentalism of Liberal reformism has been thwarted, this time by its own methods of investigation. This, of course, has no measurable effect in the calls for ever higher public school budgets. Now the reformers are convinced that public education has to start earlier, “before the lowered level of competence sets in.”[19] If a century and a half of coercive public education has failed to meet its promised goals, then there has to be more of it. All facts are interpreted in terms of the religious presuppositions of the investigators.

P. T. Bauer mentioned the belief in occultism as one of the cultural forces of economic retardation. Helmut Schoeck, the sociologist, has explored this in greater depth. His monumental study, Envy, has been conveniently ignored by most scholars. The facts he presents, however, are extremely important. His basic thesis is straightforward: envy against the wealth or achievements of others reduces the ability of individuals to advance themselves economically. Envy is not mere jealousy. It is not wanting the other man’s goods for oneself. It is the outright resentment against anyone even possessing greater wealth—the desire to reduce another person’s position even if this reduction in his wealth in no way improves the position of the envious person. Nowhere is envy more devastating in its effects than in so-called primitive cultures.

If a person or his family get ahead of the accepted tribal minimum, two very dangerous things can easily take place. First, he will be suspected of being a wizard or a witch (which can be the same thing). Second, he can become fearful of being the object of the evil magic of others. As Schoeck writes, “The whole of the literature on the subject of African sorcery shows the envious man (sorcerer) would like to harm the victim he envies, but only seldom with any expectation of thereby obtaining for himself the asset that he envies—whether this be a possession or a physical quality belonging to the other.”[20] Understandably, this envy is present only where there is close social proximity between the envious and the envied. It is always considered very difficult to bewitch a stranger with any success.[21]

The efficacy of demonic magic is strong in these non-Christian cultures. The fear of magic is pervasive. Thus, the threat of its use against the truly successful man causes men with talents to conceal them from their fellows. Men become secretive about what they own. They prefer to attribute any personal successes to luck or fate, both impersonal.

Institutionalized envy . . . or the ubiquitous fear of it, means that there is little possibility of individual economic achievement and no contact with the outside world through which the community might hope to progress. No one dares to show anything that might lead people to think he was better off. Innovations are unlikely. Agricultural methods remain traditional and primitive, to the detriment of the whole village, because every deviation from previous practice comes up against the limitations of envy.[22]

Furthermore, Schoeck writes: “It is impossible for several families to pool resources or tools of any kind in a common undertaking. It is almost equally impossible for any one man to adopt a leading role in the interests of the village.”[23] While Schoeck does not discuss it, the problem of institutionalized envy and magic for the establishment of democratic institutions in primitive cultures is almost overwhelming. Once a chief’s link to authority is destroyed, who is to lead? If a man cannot point to his family’s long tradition or authority or semi-divine status as ruler, who is to say who should lead? Whoever does proclaim himself as leader had better be prepared to defend his title from envy and magic. In a culture in which the authority of traditional rulers has been eroded by Western secularism and Western theories of individualism and democracy, the obvious alternative is power.

Perhaps most important as a retarding factor is the effect that envy has on men’s concept of time. “In a culture incapable of any form of competition, time means nothing.”[24] Men do not discuss their plans with each other. Shared goals, except of a traditional nature, are almost absent in magical societies. “Ubiquitous envy, fear of it and those who harbour it, cuts off such people from any kind of communal action directed towards the future. Every man is for himself, every man is thrown back upon his own resources. All striving, preparation and planning for the future can be undertaken only by socially fragmented, secretive beings.” [25] Is it any wonder, then, that primitive cultures stay primitive, despite massive doses of foreign aid—state-to-state aid? Schoeck does not exaggerate when he concludes: “As a system of social control, Black Magic is of tremendous importance, because it governs all interpersonal relationships.” [26]

The concept of general economic growth was not present in the pagan cultures of antiquity. It was only in Judaism and Christianity that such a view of life could flourish, precisely because economic growth was understood personally and culturally: it is the product of outward response to basic ethical requirements. Magical manipulation of the environment was rejected officially as an illegitimate form of economic practice. Prayer to a personal Creator by the humble believer is legitimate; ritual offerings to polytheistic deities or impersonal forces were outlawed. It is not ritual accuracy that God requires, but a humble heart and obedience to ethical laws (Micah 6:6-8). Christianity and Judaism prohibited envy and jealousy. Men are not to covet their neighbor’s goods (Ex. 20:17), nor are they to envy the prosperity of the wicked (Prov. 24:19-20): The whole of the 73rd Psalm is directed against the sin of envy. It could afford to warn men against fretting about the temporary prosperity of the wicked; the 72nd Psalm had promised the external, cultural, and total triumph of God on earth and in time.

The most comprehensive of all colonial American Puritan treatises was Rev. Samuel Willard’s Compleat Body of Divinity, the largest book ever published in Puritan days (1726). It was a compilation of Willard’s sermons on the Larger Cathechism [sic], which took him twenty years of Sunday evening services to finish. The section on the Eighth Commandment, the prohibition of theft, contained a comprehensive critique on envy. Willard denied that we are hurt by our neighbor’s advantages. (This fallacy has been called by Mises the Montaigne dogma, i.e., the belief that in an exchange of goods, one man’s gain is the other’s loss. It was a basic error of economic mercantilism, which was a prominent philosophy in Willard’s day. Mises correctly argues that this doctrine is at the bottom of all modern theories of class conflict. [27]) Envy, Willard continued, feeds on grief. It leads to mischief. It is utterly unreasonable, hate without a cause. It is an affront to God, for God has set men up for His purposes; envy is an affront to God’s purposes and glory in this world. Furthermore, it despises God’s gifts. It leads to covetousness (jealousy, in Schoeck’s use of the term). Men should not be tempted to take revenge on those who are more prosperous than they are. [28] With preaching like this, men found it difficult openly to envy or covet their neighbor’s prosperity. The fruits of men’s personal labor could be safely displayed. It would pay men individually to plan for the future, both individually and in groups. The free market could flourish because the ethical supports so fundamental for its existence were provided by Christian preaching and laws against magic.

Magic again is coming back into the thinking of Western men. By abandoning the belief in a Creator God and a world of personal law, modern man has been thrown back into the grim polarity of the classical world: blind impersonal fate vs. blind impersonal chance.[29] R. C. Zaehner is quite correct in beginning his study, Zen, Drugs and Mysticism (1972), with an analysis of the philosophy of the biologist, Jacques Monod (Chance and Necessity). Man is alone in an infinite world, simultaneously determined and subject to total randomness. This is all the promise of science holds for man: an endless, meaningless process of determinism and indeterminism. Men seek to escape this world by means of mystical illumination (meditation, drugs, alpha-wave machines) or by means of power from below (magic and revolution). A world without God is a world without meaning. It is a world ripe for the Satanic religion of magic.

From an economic point of view, we already have a widespread philosophy of envy present in industrial societies. If magic is reintroduced to the West, then cultural degeneration is assured. Modern society is not some autonomous mechanism. It needs ethical and philosophical support. We should heed Schoeck’s warning: “The primitive people’s belief in black magic differs little from modern ideas. Whereas the socialist believes himself robbed by the employer, just as the politician in a developing country believes himself robbed by the industrial countries, so primitive man believes himself robbed by his neighbor, the latter having succeeded by black magic in spiriting away to his own fields part of the former’s harvest.” [30] Modern secularism and socialism threaten us with economic reversal—the kind of disastrous reversal promised by God in the 28th chapter of Deuteronomy. Magic and envy, whether secular or animistic, are equally primitive.

[1] Barbara Ward, Spaceship Earth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 9-10.

[2] A choice example is Haynie’s panel of experts, gathered around a table bearing a sign, “Government Economists”: the Mad Hatter, Snoopy, Mickey Mouse (in his magician’s hat from the “Sorcerer’s Apprentice” scene in Fantasia), and Mad Magazine’s Alfred E. Newman. The caption reads: “As you know, some of our policies have been questioned of late.” Newsweek (Sept. 30, 1974), p. 62.

[3] Hayek, in Aaron Director, ed., Defense, Controls, and Inflation (University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 303.

[4] The phrase is Prof. Ludwig von Mises’. See my article, “Economics: Magical or Creationist,” The Journal of Christian Reconstruction I, 1 (Summer, 1974).

[5] See my article, “Repressed Depression,” The Freeman (April, 1969); reprinted in my book, An Introduction to Christian Economics (Nutley, N.J., Craig Press, 1973).

[6] Federal Reserve Bulletin (August, 1974), p. A 4.

[7] J. W. Burrow, Evolution and Society (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1970). On philosophical evolutionism, see Greg L. Bahnsen, “On Worshipping the Creature Rather than the Creator,” The Journal of Christian Reconstruction I, 1 (Summer, 1974).

[8] Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return (New York: Harper Torchbook, [1954] 1959); Ethelbert Stauffer, Christ and the Caesars (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955).

[9] Karl Lowith, Meaning in History (University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 172.

[10] It was Eusebius, argues Theodor Mommsen, who developed a full-fledged idea of progress: “St. Augustine and the Idea of Progress,” Journal of the History of Ideas XII (1951), 363. Cf. Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1955), Bk. X, ch. IV.

[11] Sacvan Bercovich, “Typology in Puritan New England: The Williams-Cotton Controversy Reassessed,” American Quarterly XIX (1967), 165-91, esp. 176-83; Iain Murray, The Puritan Hope (London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1971); J. A. De Jong, As the Waters Cover the Sea (Kampen, Netherlands: J. H. Kok, 1970); Aletha Joy Gilsdorf, “The Puritan Apocalypse: New England Eschatology in the Seventeenth Century” (Ph.D dissertation, history, Yale University, 1965), esp. pp. 119-20; William M. Lament, Godly Rule: Politics and Religion, 1603-60 (London: Macmillan, 1969).

[12] Robert A. Nisbet, “The Year 2000 and All That,” Commentary (June, 1968), 61.

[13] Robert Nisbet, Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), ch. 8.

[14] W. W. Rostow, ed., The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained Growth (New York: St. Martin’s, 1963). His original article had been titled, “The Take-off into Self-Sustained Growth,” Economic Journal (March, 1956).

[15] Edward C. Banfield, The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of Our Urban Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970). A revised edition, The Unheavenly City Revisited (1974), answers his critics politely.

[16] Robert A. Nisbet, “Urban Crisis Revisited.” Intercollegiate Review (Winter, 1970-71), 7. Cf. Christopher De Muth, “Banfield Returns,” The Alternative (Nov. 1974).

[17] Frederick Mosteller and Patrick Moynihan, eds., On Equality of Educational Opportunity (New York: Random House, 1972).

[18] Ibid., p. 28.

[19] Ibid., p. 49.

[20] Helmut Schoeck, Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969), p. 37.

[21] Ibid., p. 40.

[22] Ibid., p. 47.

[23] Ibid., p. 48.

[24] Ibid., p. 41.

[25] Ibid., p. 50.

[26] Ibid., p. 52.

[27] Ludwig von Mises, Human Action. 3rd ed. (Chicago: Regnery, 1966), p. 664.

[28] Samuel Willard, A Compleat Body of Divinity (New York: Johnson Reprints, [1726] 1969), pp. 750-52.

[29] Charles Norris Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture (New York: Oxford University Press. [1940]), pp. 156-60.

[30] Schoeck, Envy, p. 41.

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